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ABSTRACT: We sketch and defend a Commitment View of testimony. Unlike alternative approaches, we focus on
the ordinary act of testifying, attempting (i) to identify the commitments essential to this speech act and (ii) to
explain why those commitments are practically necessary. In view of this account, we argue that given the
commitments undertaken in testifying, a speaker’s testimony can qualify as evidence.
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INTRODUCTION
In an earlier paper, we criticized the accounts of testimony offered respectively by Elizabeth
Fricker and C.A.J. Coady for failing to adequately delineate the range of utterances that properly
qualify as testimony (Kauffeld & Fields, 2003). Although rivals, each of these accounts broadly
identifies testimony with assertions (Coady, 1992; Fricker, 1987; 1994). Neither account
specifies characteristics internal to the act of testifying which might constrain the range of
utterances which qualify as testimony. As a result, each of these highly influential accounts
admits as testimony utterances – such as gossip – that are by their nature epistemically unreliable
and so, from both theoretical and practical points of view, ought not to qualify as testimony. Our
previous essay was primarily critical: it did not develop a constructive account of the internal
characteristics that ordinarily distinguish genuine testimonial utterances from other acts of
saying-so.
The primary thrust of this essay, therefore, will be to delineate those features of the
communicative act of testifying which plainly distinguish it from other kinds of utterance. In
courts of law, someone offering testimony takes an oath committing him or herself to the
veracity of what he or she says and indicating his or her willingness to undergo crossexamination. These and related internal constraints qualify courtroom utterances as testimony.
Our question is: what commitments undertaken in connection with seriously saying something
serve in ordinary day-to-day communication to license consideration of an utterance as
testimony? Our attempts to answer this question will rely upon a broadly Gricean account of
communicative acts (Grice, 1969; Kauffeld, 2001a; 2001b; Stampe, 1967; 1970; 1975).
However, powerful objections have been raised against the kind of account we offer. The
strongest of these holds that testimony cannot be construed in terms of the freely undertaken
commitments of speakers and, at the same time, be held to be a form of evidence which
functions as justification for beliefs. Defense of our account requires that we address this
objection. That burden is born by the second part of our essay.

THE COMMITMENTS SPEAKERS UNDERTAKE IN GIVING TESTIMONY

233

THE COMMUNICATIVE ACT OF TESTIFYING
Our attention now turns to articulating a conception of testifying which accords with ordinary
usage and plain practice. ‘Testimony’ is used in several senses; our aim here is to analyze a
central sense of the term which marks out the essentials of the basic paradigm for testifying—a
paradigm which yields testimony that can be directly evaluated as evidence. We begin with an
analysis of our preferred conception of testifying and then turn to the pragmatics which underlie
and constitute acts of testifying.
The essential components of testifying
According to a recent New York Times story, on October 30, 2001, as the Enron Corporation was
coming apart at its seams, one of the company’s own lawyers, Kristina Mordaunt, approached an
outside group brought in to investigate Enron’s affairs and said, ‘I have a duty as an Enron
employee to answer your questions, and I’ll fully cooperate, but I don’t want to be part of any
political witch hunt’ (Eichenwald, 2005, p. 9). This presequence introduces a statement which
clearly qualifies as testimony. From the report of this episode we can discern the essential
components of testifying: (i) a speaker who serves as the Testimony Source (S) and an
addressee(s) to whom the testimony is given, the Testimony Recipient (R); (ii) a statement which
serves as S’s testimony; (iii) an expression of S’s consent to critical examination of her
statement(s); and (iv) S’s pledge to speak truthfully.
Consider first the partners to testimony. In our example Kristina Mordaunt is the source
of the testimony. She has, we are told, come to testify as a matter of her duty as an Enron
employee. Her ostensible motivation, while relevant to appraising her testimony and also
characteristic of one sort of testimony, is not an essential feature of the communicative act she is
performing. Testifying, per se, is not identified by the considerations which induce persons to
speak up. Some witnesses are hostile and speak only because they are enjoined to testify; others
are paid for their testimony; many testify as a matter of cooperating in a joint venture. Ms.
Mordaunt testified in an institutional setting. That is often the case with testimony but is not
essential. We testify in a variety of institutional and non-institutionalized settings.
Second, Ms. Mordaunt approaches the investigators in order to make a statement; she has
come to seriously say things to them. Her utterances, what she says as reported in direct or in
indirect speech, make up her testimony, and it may also be reported as her ‘statement.’ She tells
the committee (according to our reporter) that more than year before she was approached by an
Enron executive, was presented and accepted a now suspect investment opportunity. If Ms.
Mordaunt did not say that, then it would not be true that she has so testified. It will be true that S
has testified that p, only if it is true S said that p.
Third, Ms. Mordaunt manifestly consents to critical examination of her statement. She
makes her consent apparent by deliberately and openly speaking with the intention of answering
the investigators’ questions regarding what she knows about matters relevant to their inquiry.
The intention with which she purports to speak belongs to a large family of speaker-intentions,
members of which are essential to a variety of communicative acts. Where a speaker makes a
proposal, she speaks with the intention of answering such questions, doubts, objections etc. as
might be raised in response to some proposition she puts forward for consideration and, possibly,
action (Kauffeld, 1995; 1998). In primitive cases of accusing, the accuser tries to impose on the
accused an obligation to answer the accusation (Kauffeld, 1998). We routinely initiate

234

FRED J. KAUFFELD AND JOHN E. FIELDS

discussions by announcing our willingness to answer questions; we are, we say, ‘open to
questions.’ Someone giving testimony deliberately and openly gives it to be known that she is
speaking with the intention of answering her addressees’ questions. To say that a potential
witness refused to answer one’s questions is to say that the witness refused to testify. Even in the
case where a witness is only willing to speak for the record and refuses to answer questions from
her immediate audience, her address for the record clearly anticipates future questions. Of course
persons often openly speak with this intention in contexts where no actual dialogue in the form
of questions asked and answered occurs. Questions are often anticipated and attributed to
addressees on the basis of the speaker’s supposition about their interests and need to know.
Commonly, when persons openly speak with the intention of answering questions, they
circumscribe the range of inquiries they will entertain. Thus a speaker may specify the focus or
topic for questions she is willing to answer by requesting questions regarding, her argument, her
lecture, her recent travels, etc. Occasionally a speaker may place certain questions off limits. Ms.
Mordaunt circumscribes the intention with which she speaks in two ways: first, she is there to
answer questions out of her duty as an Enron employee; that duty is to cooperate in the inquiry.
Second, she is unwilling to join in a witch hunt, i.e., she is unwilling to engage in speculation
focused on the guilt of specific individuals. Consistent with this later commitment she declines to
answer questions which invite her to speculate about the plans of a fellow employee, Andrew
Fastow. She is willing to identify assumptions she made relative to actions she took, but she
restricts herself to telling the investigators what she knows. Ms. Mordant deliberately and openly
speaks with the intention of answering questions regarding what she knows about matters related
to the focus of her addressees’ investigation. This intention is an essential component of
communicative act she is performing.
When testifying, a person openly speaks with the intention of answering questions
regarding her knowledge of matters of serious interest to her addressees. Testimony naturally
focuses on what a speaker knows. Related assumptions and qualification may enter into a
person’s testimony, but what is wanted in testimony is a representation of what the testifier
knows and how she comes to know it. It would be odd to say, e. g., * ‘We have asked Martha to
testify, although we all (including Martha) know that she knows nothing relevant to our inquiry.’
(Though, of course, we might conduct a little charade in which Martha goes through the act of
testifying.) And it is also apparent that when testifying a speaker openly intends to respond to
questions bearing on the serious inquiry, investigation, deliberation, etc. of her addressees. It
would be odd for recipients of testimony to insist that a source should testify about matter which
the recipients admitted had no bearing on their investigation.
The fourth essential component of Ms. Mordaunt’s communicative act is her pledge to
speak truthfully. In order to testify in courts of law, witnesses must take an oath swearing to tell
the truth. Our dictionaries recognize that an attestation of veracity, i.e., some explicit affirmation
by S that what she says is true is an essential part of testifying in the sense of interest here (OED,
‘testify’, first entry). As reported, Christine Mordaunt provides such affirmation by saying that
she is there to cooperate fully with the inquiry. ‘Full cooperation’ here means not only that she
will answer her addressees’ questions but also that she will provide answers on which they can
rely. By this commitment she attests to the veracity of her testimony. In many cases similar
commitments are elicited in a preliminary solicitation during which R explains to S the
importance of the inquiry and the need to rely on what potentially knowledgeable parties can
contribute. Here S’s consent to answer R’s question would attest to the truthfulness of her
statement(s). The minimal explicit commitment to truthfulness required of S is a pledge to speak
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the truth if only because she supposes that her addressees may ultimately rely on what she says.
It is this commitment which differentiates Ms. Mordaunt’s testimony from a mere self-report of
her actions. That commitment, of course, can be undertaken in many forms, including an oath
swearing to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
In summary, it will be true that S has testified that p, only if (i) S said that p, (ii)
deliberately and openly speaking with the intention of answering R’s questions regarding what
she knows about matters bearing on R’s investigation, and (iii) S commits herself to speaking
truthfully in view of the possibility that R may rely upon what she says. These are the essential
components of our core conception of the act of testifying. Using that concept, we do ourselves
sometimes truthfully report that so and so testified that p, and in those cases the speaker will
have performed an act which has, at a minimum, the components essential to our concept of
testifying. Working on the substantive assumption that our conception of testimony is based on a
stable, often efficacious practice, let us now inquire into how in paradigm cases a communicative
act with these components might reasonably be expected to work
The pragmatics of testifying
In what follows we offer and defend the plausibility of a conjecture about the practical
constitution of our speech act, the strategic calculation which guides speakers and addressees in
paradigm cases of testifying.
At its pragmatic base, the act of testifying is designed to enable R to collect and evaluate
statements as evidence bearing on R’s inquiry into matters of serious concern to R. Persons
sometimes have the task of evaluating evidence and reasoning in order to reach a conclusion or
decision about matters of considerable importance, decisions and judgments for which R must
accept primary or full responsibility. A serious inquiry of this sort can rarely be conducted
entirely on the basis of inquirer’s first hand experience; as a practical matter, others must be
consulted. In such cases a prudent investigator seeks persons who have or seem to have
knowledge that could serve as evidence filling in the gaps in what the inquiring party already
knows. By engaging an apparently knowledgeable source in conversation, an inquirer can (in
favorable circumstances) come to know what the former knows about the matter in question.
Testifying is, per hypothesis, characteristically designed to enable an inquirer to acquire
statements from others which can serve as evidence and reliable bases in reaching conclusions.
The central practical difficulty facing persons who seek testimony (and also those who
seek to provide it) arises from the fact that persons responsible for a serious inquiry typically
cannot just accept what others are willing to tell them on the basis of the other’s say so. Where a
speaker says that p, e. g., that she was given and accepted an opportunity to invest in one of
Enron’s sham partners, she engages (other things being equal) a presumption that she is speaking
truthfully, i.e., that she is expressing beliefs she sincerely holds on the basis of a reasonable
effort to ascertain their truth (Stampe, 1967; 1975). In many circumstances, that presumption
provides adequate warrant for simply accepting what the speaker says as the truth (Kauffeld,
2001a; Stampe, 1967). But in the circumstances which call for testimony, the inquiring party
cannot simply rely on that presumption. Part of the difficulty is that the presumption of veracity
is vague as to what the speaker has actually done to ascertain the truth of what she says, and it is
notoriously the case that persons believe they know things on the basis of woefully inadequate
efforts to determine the truth of the contents of those beliefs. In circumstances where the
inquiring party must accept responsibility for a decision or judgment of major concern, the
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inquiring party needs to check out and test what he is told by seemingly knowledgeable sources.
He wants to know what his sources believe they know about matters bearing on his inquiry and
also how they come to know the stuff they purport to know, how their statements compare to the
statements of others, etc. In short, he needs to be able to critically and publicly examine potential
sources of evidence.
That need, in turn, creates two difficulties which, we submit, testimony is
characteristically designed to resolve. The first is the problem of consent, and the second is the
problem of veracity.
We do not, in general, have a right to critically question others about what they say to us.
There are, to be sure, a good many institutionalized relationships within which one party is
authorized to cross-examine others regarding what they say. But testimony can also be secured in
non-institutional settings and by persons who are not specially authorized to demand it of others.
In the ordinary course of affairs persons normally do not have a right to critically question what
others say to them. Nor is it the case that persons generally can be expected to be enthusiastic
about entering a conversation in which what they say is subject to critical examination. For one
thing such conversations may well seem pointless to a potential source of information. One’s
critical questions are apt to meet with a response on this order: ‘If you’re not going to believe
what I say, what’s the point to answering your questions?’ For another, conspicuous refusal to
simply accept what others tell us on the presumption that they are speaking truthfully would in
many cases be taken as an insult. Moreover, having one’s statements examined critically under
the pressure of questioning carries an unsettling risk of exposure. Even where one is certain
about what one knows, it still may turn out that one is mistaken, and, sometimes, an impeccably
knowledgeable witness gets tripped up by questions. So, commonly persons have a right to
abstain from answering questions about what they have said when those questions issue from a
skeptical supposition that they might be mistaken or otherwise in error, and they often have
motivation to abstain. The upshot of this is that in the circumstances which lead an inquirer to
seek testimony, it typically will be necessary to secure the consent of the information source in
order to press one’s questions.
This necessity explains in practical terms why a manifestation of consent is an essential
component of our concept of testimony. A speaker can, by deliberately and openly giving it to be
believed that she is willing to answer questions regarding what she knows bearing on another’s
inquiry, manifest her consent to critical scrutiny of her answers. Per hypothesis, such consent is
practically necessary to securing testimony in paradigm cases of this communicative act.
In addition to this expression of consent the inquirer also needs from the potential
informant a reassuring commitment to speak truthfully. This need is rooted in the impact which
A’s manifest skepticism has on the conditions which enable parties in a conversation to trust each
other. Other things being equal, where a person seriously says that p, she incurs an obligation to
speak truthfully. The general conditions under which such obligations are incurred have been
illuminated for us by G. J. Warnoch. According to that eminent English philosopher, one party
(B) incurs an obligation to do x, where (i) another party (C) is counting on B to x, and (ii) C will
suffer harm if B fails to x, and (iii) B will have spoken or acted falsely, should B fail to have xed
(Warnock, 1971). Thus where a speaker says that p, deliberately and openly speaking with
intention that her addressee believes that p, she incurs an obligation to speak truthfully. If she is
insincere or careless regarding the truthfulness of what she says, she risks causing her addressee
the harm of believing something which is false, under circumstances in which the addressee has
reason to rely on her veracity, and in which she will have spoken falsely (Kauffeld, 2001a;
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Stampe, 1967). Consider now the impact which a skeptical attitude on the part of a critical
questioner has on this rational framework under-girding conversational trust. A manifestly
skeptical inquirer is patently unwilling to simply rely on what his information source says as
regards the content and formation of what she purports to know. It will at least be apparent that
the credence he gives her statements will depend on what the inquirer takes her answers to show
about the empirical and rationale adequacy of the beliefs she expresses, the apparent sincerity of
her utterances, how her answers square with each other and with other sources of information,
etc. Accordingly, the potential information source has good reason to doubt whether the inquirer
is relying on or will rely on her truthfulness in forming his own beliefs about the matters in
question, and with this doubt, if nothing is done to correct the situation, she will have
corresponding reason to doubt whether she is obliged to truthfully answer the skeptical inquirer’s
questions.
We can now see why a pledge to speak truthfully is a practically necessary component in
paradigm cases of testifying. It would not do to have S proceed on the supposition that, since R is
responsible for checking out the truthfulness of her utterances and seems determined to do, she is
free to provide false and evasive answers. In order for S’s statements to merit critical
examination, she must produce them while bearing a mutually recognized obligation to speak
truthfully. So something on the order of a reassuring pledge of veracity is practically necessary to
enable R to collect potentially reliable testimony. An inquirer can secure such reassurance, where
a potential source of testimony commits herself to telling the truth if only because she supposes
that the inquirer may ultimately rely upon her answers. That commitment we have seen is a
minimally essential component of testifying.
There is much more to say about this rather preliminary account. Arguably, it squares
with the ways in which a speaker’s performance in the act of testifying and her immediate
product are criticized. It remains to be seen whether the conditions offered by way of analysis are
sufficient, whether our paradigm of testimony exhibits a practical calculation variants of which
can be seen to be at work in related kinds of testimony. But we at least have an initial view of the
conditions which are essential to an important ordinary conception of testimony and,
correspondingly, are practically necessary to successful performances of acts of that kind, and
we have a plausible conjecture as to why those conditions are both practically and conceptually
necessary to testifying.
THE EVIDENTIAL OBJECTION
As we stated in the introduction, there is an argument against this way of viewing testimony that
must be dealt with if the approach is to have any chance of being correct. This argument has to
do with the sort of justification that instances of testimony, construed in the way that we do,
would provide for the beliefs that their addressees might base upon them. The argument goes like
this. Assume that, in general, testimony does provide justification for those who receive it to
entertain certain relevant beliefs. (There may also be reasons, along the lines of what Coady
(1992) and Price (1969) have proposed, to believe that testimony, in general, does this. But, for
the purposes of our discussion here, it does no harm to treat this as a basic rational assumption.)
It then follows that the view of testimony being proposed is false, for: this view of testimony
entails that the sort of justification that a piece of testimony t provides an addressee A for
believing that p is non-evidential.
1.
But the justification that t provides A for believing that p must be evidential.
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2.

Therefore, testimony does not provide justification for those who receive it to entertain
certain relevant beliefs.
3.
But (by assumption) testimony does provide such justification.
4.
Therefore, this view of testimony is false.
Our goal in this section of our paper is to show how and why this argument doesn’t work.
First, we examine the evidence in favor of the second premise, attempting to determine if, in fact,
there is reason to believe that this premise is true. Second, we examine the evidence in favor of
the first premise, attempting, with respect to it, to do the same. Our claim will be that, while
there is good reason to believe that the second premise is true and that testimonial justification
does need to be evidential, there is no good reason to believe that premise one is true – that the
sort of view we are proposing would permit only a non-evidential form of testimonial
justification. Indeed, we argue to the contrary, a commitment theory of testimony is essentially
an evidentialist theory, because, on it, speaker-commitments (when genuine) reveal something
about the character of the speaker. They are a manifestation of those stable dispositions in a
person that can be reliably linked – that is, evidentially linked – to certain sorts of action and
activities.
Why testimonial justification must be evidential
Must testimonial justification be evidential? There are at least three basic reasons to argue that it
is. First, testimony is used as evidence in a variety of formal settings. When, for example, two
people are engaged in an adversarial dispute in a court of law, or when a single individual or a
group of individuals is being prosecuted by the state, eyewitness or expert testimony is
invariably relied upon by the judge or jury as evidence. It is used both to establish certain factual
particulars of the case at hand, and as a basis upon which the persons empowered to render
decisions in such cases make their final judgments, as well as numerous subsidiary inferences.
Second, testimony is used as evidence in a number of important non-formal settings. Say
that a scientist is trying to determine whether or not the results that she obtained in a particular
experiment ought to be relied upon. If others have been doing work in the same area of study,
she will want to compare her results with theirs. In doing so, she will make no distinctions
between what she has done and what has been done by others, in terms of the potential evidential
value of each. The accounts that have been produced by others with respect to their work she will
treat as evidence in favor of one set of scientific claims, while the results that she has obtained
through her own work she will treat as evidence in favor of the same set of claims, or another set,
as the case may be. In comparing her own work with others, she balances what she takes to be
evidence against evidence, without seeing any essential difference in the way that her own
observations support her claims and the reports that she has received of the observations of
others.
And, finally, the alternative to treating testimony as evidence is just not all that palatable.
We understand (or at least we think that we understand) what we mean when we say that a tree’s
rings are evidence for some claim about that tree’s age. We mean that there is some sort of
reliable connection between the first of these states of affairs and the second, such that we can
use a statement referring to the first in order to generate likely conclusions about the second. But
what could it possibly mean to say that a piece of testimony gives us a non-evidential
justification for some belief or claim about the world? Does it give us permission to believe that
such-and-such is the case simpliciter, without the underlying belief that there is some sort of
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reliable connection between the speaker’s utterances and the way the world seems to be? That
interpretation founders on the fact that one of the quickest ways to undermine the justificatory
power of a testimonial statement is to demonstrate that there are inadequacies in the perceptual
or cognitive abilities of the individual producing it. Or does it merely provide the ground for our
responding in the ways that we do? Is testimony no more than a trigger for a set of responses and
behaviors that are rationally justified only insofar as they are part of all human beings’ natural
inheritance? This way of looking at it is problematic, as well. For while people do sometimes
respond to what others have said by automatically forming certain beliefs and leaving it at that
(this is typical of small children and perhaps also of those who are extremely gullible), they also
respond by using testimonial statements in inferences that they make – by treating them as
evidence.
It will not do, then, to treat testimonial justification as something other than evidential. It
would conflict with how people use testimony in formal settings. It would conflict with how
people use testimony in important informal settings. And it would require a notion of
justificatory power that would do violence to the ways in which testimony is actually employed
by all but the most naïve of human believers.
An argument in favor of the non-evidentiality of testimonial justification
Clearly, then, testimonial justification is necessarily evidential. Less clear, however, is whether it
can be conceived in this manner on a Commitment View of Testimony. For on that view, as we
have been expounding it, an addressee R is justified in believing that p on the basis of a speaker
S’s testimony t, given that S has freely undertaken to commit herself to the veracity of t and is
willing to be questioned regarding t and/or its subject matter. R is justified in his beliefs, in other
words, on this view, because S followed through on a set of choices that S freely made – choices
that, as the word ‘freely’ indicates, originated with S and that S could have genuinely decided not
to make (that is, assuming that hard determinism is not true).
The problem, as several writers have noted, is that this view of testimony seems to be at
odds with our notions of evidence and evidential justification (Moran, 1999; Ross, 1986; Weiner,
2003). Recall the example of the tree rings and the age of a tree. The reason why we are willing
to allow the former to count as evidence in favor of claims about the latter is because we know
that there is a direct and reliable connection between the two states of affairs, one that has been
confirmed by numerous past correlations and is explained in terms of the processes and causal
powers engaged in and possessed by (certain sorts of) trees. If this relation did not exist, or
existed only haphazardly – varying from tree to tree for no discernable reason – we would not be
able to employ statements referring to a tree’s rings as evidence in an argument about that tree’s
age. Instead, we would conclude, from looking at any given tree’s rings, that we had no idea how
old that tree was on the basis of its rings alone.
But notice that this sort of direct and reliable connection is exactly what seems to be
missing from the Commitment View of Testimony. On that view, it is not the case that the
addressee is justified in basing her beliefs on what another has testimonially stated because that
individual has been affected by reality in some direct and reliable way (a way that terminates
with that individual stating what she says to A). Indeed, if the basis for a speaker S testifying to
something in such a case were of this nature, it would be a reason, on the Commitment View of
Testimony, for thinking that what S had said was not testimony. It would not even count as a
speech-act, but rather as some sort of speech-compulsion.
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Instead, what is going on here is that S, in speaking, has simply created a representation
of reality, much as one might create an oil portrait or a watercolor landscape. Representational
elements are certainly at play, but they are present, not due to some direct (reliable, explicable)
causal activity on the part of that which they represent, but rather because of the free choice of
the individual who employs them. As a result, the picture of reality proffered by the speaker in
such a situation, while it may be accurate or inaccurate, is not evidence for anything beyond the
speaker’s wishes and intentions. It is not evidence for the state of affairs that S is trying to get A
to believe, anymore than a portrait by Gilbert Stuart of George Washington kissing Abigail
Adams is, in and of itself, evidence that she was stepping out on John. And so, it does not
provide evidential justification for the truth of any belief that A might have formed about that
state of affairs as a result of receiving S’s testimony.
Objections to this argument
However, there is no good reason to think that a Commitment View of Testimony has this sort of
implication and a set of very good reasons to think that it does not. Consider again the example
of Gilbert Stuart painting a portrait of General Washington caught in flagrante delicto with the
delightful Mrs. Adams. It is true that, considered as an artifact, without any knowledge of the
painter’s experiences, intentions, or general state of mind, this picture gives us no evidence
regarding the actual relations between these two individuals. (Blackmailers in the eighteenth
century had to use letters to ply their trade, and even then the victim could always claim that the
letters were forgeries.) But what about those cases where we do have such knowledge? What if
we knew that Gilbert Stuart was an honorable and reliable man, that he had a code of ethics and a
professional standard that did not permit him to pass off made-up images of reality as genuine?
Wouldn’t this make a difference as to how we would treat the painting? After all, if we knew
these things about Stuart, we would also have strong reason to believe that there was a direct,
consistent connection between those events that he had himself experienced and what he freely
chose to represent as that experience. They would be connected by his tendency to accurately
represent those elements of reality that he has freely chosen to portray.
The preceding argument presupposes a highly malnourished notion of effective
causation. In fact, it seems to involve a simplistic bifurcation. The implication is that the only
acceptable ways of viewing causation are: (1) causation is impersonal, deterministic and,
thereby, gives you evidence and (2) causation is personal, unreliable, and, thereby, gives you no
evidence. But, as can be seen from the Stuart example, there are other ways of viewing causation
than just these two. There is also the possibility that personal causation can include both free and
stable elements. This idea, which is very much part of our common ‘folk psychology,’ has been
seriously discussed by philosophers at least as far back as Aristotle, who famously referred to the
stable elements in the human psyche as propensities or dispositions to act. On Aristotle’s view,
as in ‘folk psychology,’ such propensities or dispositions are not unchangeable. They can be
modified through training and moral instruction. But they are reliable enough to warrant our
saying under certain circumstances, ‘What she did surprises me’ and ‘That doesn’t seem like the
kind of thing that she would do at all.’ In other words, they provide us with evidence one way or
the other about what people are likely to do.
Of course, when Aristotle was talking about these propensities or dispositions, he was
primarily thinking about traits like ‘courage,’ ‘self-control,’ and ‘magnificence’ and about how
these contributed to each individual’s personal excellence. He was not thinking about the
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epistemological or evidential consequences for others of individuals possessing certain traits.
But, nonetheless, using this model of the psyche, and the picture of personal causation that it
entails, we can easily see how we would generate such consequences and what these
consequences would be. Take, for example, the critical notion of ‘trustworthiness.’ While, on the
one hand, this concept can certainly be used only to evaluate an individual’s personal moral
excellence (with no consideration of what its presence or absence might mean for others), on the
other, having evidence in favor of its presence or absence in someone would have significant
epistemic implications for those who had the occasion to rely upon this individual for the content
of their beliefs. This is because, in such a case, evidence that the individual was trustworthy
would be evidence for something along the following lines: that there was a propensity or
disposition in the individual to produce sincere, competently arrived-at statements of purported
fact. That is what trustworthiness with respect to ‘tellings’ is all about. And, thus, in such a case,
there would evidence of a reliable connection between what has been told and the ways things
really are. And, thus, on the notion of evidence that we have been using so far, there would be
evidence in favor of the likely truth of what has been told.
What our view contributes to this picture of justification is a set of conditions under
which an addressee A can be justified in the belief that a speaker S is likely to be trustworthy
(with respect to a range of testimonial statements), and thus justified – evidentially – in accepting
as factual the content of one of S’s pieces of testimony. On our view, what justifies A in
believing that S is trustworthy with respect to a particular piece of testimony, t, is the fact that, in
connection with stating t, S openly commits herself to truthfully answering skeptical questions
about what she knows. Given that criticism and the potential loss of reputation that successful
criticism produces are genuine harms for S, it is unlikely that she would openly risk, indeed
invite, such criticism were she telling falsehoods or speaking without requisite authority.
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